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1 Affect theory and 
performance intention
Chapter 1 explores some of the intersections between affect theory about 
energetic flow and performance theory about felt qualities of ‘live’ and ‘pres-
ence’. Recent affect theory, however, delineates affect that is nonemotional 
and formless and no longer simply interchangeable with emotional feeling, 
and theoretical approaches eschew the subjective and personal experience 
that typifies performance. This chapter asserts that both affect and emotional 
feeling can be distinguished in performance given the divided history of 
emotional feeling and the distinction in affect theory between bodily sen-
sation and nonhuman energetic movement. These distinctions are initially 
introduced with Rimini Protokoll’s Uncanny Valley, which is analyzed sub-
sequently in relation to concepts of impersonal affect and personal emotional 
feeling in conjunction with Angela Bartram’s Licking Dogs.
Recent affect theory encompasses human sensitivity to energies, and it 
generates some compelling concepts. Put simply, new materialist discourse 
on affect is offering a shorthand way of conceiving of energetic pulsation and 
movement at a cellular level. These theoretical ideas of affect are important, 
because they seem to reflect what is physiologically feasible and scientifically 
accepted in the twenty-first century.
While the recognition of affect within performance reflects innovative 
thinking, it often subsumes concepts of feeling and sidesteps the divisions 
such as those between what is natural and cultural and between collective 
and subjective experience. The feeling arising from aesthetic engagement is 
recognized as being inherently ideological, connected to the organization 
and structures of society (Williams 1977). The way feeling is enmeshed in 
cultural meaning comes to the fore in theatrical performance. Theoretical 
approaches that deem affect to be unstructured and formless would seem to 
contradict the way forms of performance reflect artistic intention and social 
and/or political meaning. Therefore Chapter 1 considers the argument that 
affect theory is antithetical to concepts of ‘intention’ (Leys 2011; 2018). It 
proposes that affect theory and performance theory can be reconciled when 
differing patterns of feeling are recognized through the ways in which: firstly, 
performance evokes affect as well as emotional feeling as it gains spectator 
attention; secondly, a specific production involves artistic and socio-political 
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intentions within a general live effect; and thirdly, performance is explained 
in detached language about presence. A depersonalizing effect in the recep-
tion of performance supports a general condition of affect and a precept of 
intensity.
Distinctions in performance
Rimini Protokoll’s Uncanny Valley by Stefan Kaegi presented a human-
like robot as the performer in a live performance that was also filmed, and 
remains available online Rimini Protokoll (2018). Opening to a live audience 
on 4 October 2018, it challenged an assumption that theatrical performance 
involves the transmission of emotional feeling from performer to spectator and 
an exchange between them. Instead, Uncanny Valley explicitly illustrated the-
ory about the bodily experience of affect in relation to how technology and 
its energetic movement permeates twenty-first-century human worlds (e.g. 
Clough 2007b). Uncanny Valley involved an ‘animatronic double’, a life-like 
robot copy of the actor, Thomas Melle, and this literal replacement encapsu-
lates some of the dilemmas of twenty-first-century technological progress (see 
below). The robot sat on stage in front of a live audience, with moving lips, 
face, head and arms and a foot that moved. It was positioned next to a screen 
that showed interviews with scientists, and its first-person voice described the 
lives of the actor, Thomas Melle, and the mathematician, Alan Turing. Melle’s 
voiceover said, ‘If you’ve come to see an actor, you’re in the wrong place’. There 
was no live actor and Melle appeared on screen along with scientific experts 
who are a regular feature of productions by this company, which is renowned 
for creating immersive participatory performance (Garde and Mumford 2016).
After describing Uncanny Valley as a lecture on ‘the problem of instability’, 
the voiceover recounted that the sensory space in which a human perceives a 
life-like robot is called an ‘uncanny valley’ within science. A cognitive com-
mentary overlaid the electrified computerized stage effects that drew sensory 
attention and embodied responses. The voiceover then gave an account of the 
painful emotional experiences of Melle who was treated for manic depres-
sion (bipolar disorder), and those of Turing as a homosexual in 1950s England 
forced to take medication by the authorities. The Rimini Protokoll production 
separated the visible robot from human audio descriptions of emotional expe-
rience. It exemplified the way emotional feeling is not necessarily embodied in 
theatrical performance that invites cognitive and sensory responses.
Performance involves a set of responses and reactions prior to the process of 
analyzing that are often difficult to include in an interpretation of cognitive 
meaning. I viewed the robot in Uncanny Valley with surprise and admiration, 
before I began to cognitively question the ethics of replacing a live actor 
with a robot – making the human actor obsolete and performance training 
irrelevant. I also learnt that Turing wrote a treatise on forms in nature as I 
continued watching Uncanny Valley with both curiosity and trepidation. The 
bodily processes of viewing performance are frequently outside its analysis, 
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except that Rimini Protokoll’s production clearly associated an idea of the 
uncanny with its use of technology. In his exploration of the uncanny double 
created by a screen image of an actor who is live on stage, Matthew Causey 
considers that the body’s subjectivity is split and has been ‘extended, chal-
lenged and reconfigured’ in ‘presenting the unpresentable’ real (2006: 6, 29). 
A screen double divides sensory comprehension as it impacts on bodily feel-
ing. The destabilizing uncanny effect of a double is compounded by the sim-
ulation of realness with the robot actor in Uncanny Valley, which is doubled 
by Melle’s screen image. The uncanny in psychoanalytical analysis refers to 
a felt psychic quality arising from something familiar that reverses a capacity 
to reassure, and it is associated with social situations (e.g. Wetherell 2012: 21). 
Figure 1.1 Rimini Protokoll (2018), Uncanny Valley. Photographer, Gabriela Neeb.
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The familiar feels disturbing. The actor figure looked human but the encoun-
ter felt strange. The affect arising from viewing the robot double and a per-
ception of the uncanny coincide in Uncanny Valley.
A narrative about emotional experience was separated from the visual 
impact. The voiceover of Uncanny Valley also referred to mirror neurons and 
empathy in human exchanges (see Chapter 5), as the performance suggested 
the ‘he is me’ effect of a robot and also seemed emblematic of the demise of 
the live self. Yet the voiceover describing the painful emotional experience 
of Melle and Turing implied a partial resolution for Melle’s emotional suf-
fering. These personal emotional conditions sit outside affect theory about 
energetic flow, and theatrical performance commonly sets out to connect 
with its audience by framing the emotions and emotional feeling within pro-
cesses of physical and verbal expression and with narrative. Uncanny Valley, 
too, invited emotional feeling with its audio commentary while the robot 
separately elicited responses.
Rimini Protokoll’s production combined affect-inducing energetic cir-
cuitry and a humanoid shape that evoked the uncanny. Its exposition about 
emotional feeling invited other types of feeling, however, to complicate the 
interpretation. While this discussion of Uncanny Valley seeks to reconcile per-
formance theory with affect theory, challenges are posed by subjectively felt 
responses. A separation of affect and emotional feeling in the discussion of 
the Rimini Protokoll production reflects a long history of division within 
explanations of feeling.
Feeling divided
As outlined briefly here, the concept of emotional feeling involves divisions 
and it has been historically unstable even in a binary with reason. Although 
affect’s previous association with emotional feeling is still evident in schol-
arship, Chapter 1 refers to the expanded theory about intangible movement 
and energetic flow and nonemotional sensation. While affect theory offers a 
twenty-first-century approach, it arises in the shadow of twentieth-century 
arguments about the emotions in which culture and language interpolate 
nature and biology (Leys 2018). These arguments about the emotions are rel-
evant to a culturally created form such as performance, and the value of affect 
theory for performance analysis comes from expanding on existing concepts. 
A summary of the historical and ongoing divisions in concepts of feeling is 
presented here to support the use of multiple concepts for emotion in this 
book, and to facilitate an appreciation of both affect and emotional feeling in 
theatrical performance (also see Introduction).
Theatre has featured prominently in Western cultural divisions over emo-
tions because the theatrical evocation of emotional feeling was contentious 
historically. Aristotle argued for the worth of particular emotions inclu-
sive of emotional feelings stimulated by thought within theatre, in contrast 
to Plato who considered that emotional feeling corrupted reason, and he 
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condemned poetic theatre for its emotional impact (Fortenbaugh 2002: 9) 
(see Chapter 2). The hierarchical dualism of mind over body identified with 
Descartes functioned as the dominant Western philosophical framework and 
sidelined ideas to the contrary, including those of Baruch Spinoza discern-
ing active and passive feelings outside rationality (e.g. Damasio 2003; Reevy 
2010: 3). A conceptual separation of bodily emotions as natural and rea-
son as cultural and superior persisted, associated with an expectation of the 
mental control of emotional passions. Even so, moral philosophers, including 
Mary Wollstonecraft, sought more nuanced interpretations ‘of love in par-
ticular, or of emotion in general’ (e.g. Mendus 2000: 3). The general word 
‘emotion’ that had appeared in English by the seventeenth century and came 
into use during the nineteenth century replaced ‘passion’. Passion had been 
extensively demonstrated in theatre, which was considered to have special-
ized knowledge (Roach 1985). Theatre had continued to be condemned in 
varying ways because of its emotional impact. For example, Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau designates nature as being nobler and purer than culture as he 
condemns the emotions of civilization as degraded, and, following Plato, 
bans theatre because it will ‘weaken’ his ideal state (1968: 116). For Rousseau, 
theatre that appropriately evokes tears had been decadently corrupted and 
instead audiences leave ‘with the edifying reminiscence of having been, in 
the depths of their hearts, accomplices of the crimes they had seen commit-
ted’, and it is especially corrupting of women (1968: 46).
Ideas about the naturalness of the emotions developed into a concept of 
universalism in Western culture. It was extended to nonhuman animals by 
eighteenth-century philosopher, David Hume (2009), who encompasses 
both thought and emotions as he discerns attributes of pride and humil-
ity and sympathy and gratitude in humans and in nonhuman animals. It 
was the observational research of Charles Darwin (1999) in 1872, however, 
that firmly established practices of comparing emotions in humans and non-
human animals. Darwin models a science of empirically studying the bod-
ily expression and behaviour of nonhuman animals, so that an explanation 
of evolution and about human manipulation of the nonhuman world (and 
tool-making) developed in tandem with ideas about the evolutionary devel-
opment of the emotions. But Darwin’s universalizing approach also implic-
itly undermines belief in the specialness of humanity derived from emotional 
sensibilities, self-control and will power (Bain 1875). If human emotions are 
comparable to uncontrollable animal natures, then human distinctiveness 
relied on a capacity to reason based on intelligence indicated by language – 
a division that continued within twentieth-century modernism and in sci-
ence. Irrespective of the ethics of ongoing research with animals, by the late 
twentieth century, research verifies reasoning by nonhuman animals as well 
as complex emotional feeling in relation to fairness and even empathy (e.g. 
de Waal 2010).
Significantly, William James and Carl Lange (1967) argue by 1884 that the 
physiology of emotional feeling in the human body happens prior to mental 
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apprehension. The dominance of mental capacity was undermined. As part 
of an ongoing effort to explain emotions, James reset the prevailing order 
that assumed thought before feeling when he writes: ‘My theory, on the con-
trary, is that the bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and 
that our feeling of the same changes as they occur is the emotion’ (1918: 1095, italics 
in original). He classifies some emotions such as curiosity and love as instincts 
and other subtler emotions according to their forms. Even though James rec-
ognizes that provocation connects to emotional feeling, he argues for rapid 
internal processes outstripping thought and contends that emotional feeling 
arises in the body’s motor and sensory physiology. This was followed in the 
1920s by Walter Cannon’s concept of a body-brain- centred flight or fight 
response that happens more rapidly than the body’s other chemical changes 
(Reevy 2010: 5, 6). Yet, in James’s approach, feeling had an association with 
the qualities of the sensible world, and he contends that the study of the 
emotions should not ignore ‘the aesthetic sphere of the mind, its longings, its 
pleasures and pains’ (1967: 11). But his ideas became recognized as constitut-
ing a feedback loop. Regardless of any perceived flaws in James’s approach, 
a physiological experience of emotional feeling was being recognized and 
thereby separated from an idea of – the word for – an emotion in twenti-
eth-century study.
The elevation of physiological responses was challenged by a question 
about where to locate the stimuli for bodily feeling, which became a central 
contention during the twentieth century (Parkinson, Fischer and Manstead 
2005). To what extent do emotional feelings arise in response to external 
stimuli including language? At stake is the sequence or order in which feel-
ings arise. Magda Arnold (1960) discerns a cognitive function in the biolog-
ical appraisal of emotional stimuli (see Chapter 3). In summary, cognitive 
approaches to the biology of emotional feelings such as those of appraisal 
theory contend that embodied responses happen within an a priori orienta-
tion in and to the world. Later appraisal theory holds that cognitive appraisal 
can precede conscious thought. Nonetheless other twentieth-century fields, 
including scientific ones, continue to uphold the underlying capacity of biol-
ogy, and resist the primacy of perspective and positioning. The study of the 
emotions and emotional feelings becomes divided between investigating the 
body’s physiology and approaches locating the body-self in the world and in 
cultural language. By the late twentieth century, the study of emotional feel-
ing originating in the physical brain aligns with a larger effort to understand 
where to locate consciousness, and the mind. At that time, the psychological 
study of emotional feeling recognizes that it is central to thinking and belief, 
rather than separate and following after cognition (Forgas 2000b).
Although commonly unified within lived experience, emotional feel-
ings become distinguished from social ideas of the emotions in their twen-
tieth-century study, including within neuro-scientific study of the brain 
(e.g. Panksepp 1998; Damasio 2004). The demarcation of different types 
of bodily feeling had been long accommodated in philosophical reasoning 
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by the distinction between thirst and hunger and the emotional feelings, 
which are less easily separated and explained, and therefore remain grouped 
together (Solomon 1977). While thirst is a distinctive bodily sensation, anx-
iety might not be easily distinguished from a stronger emotion such as fear. 
Admittedly, these categories do not always remain distinctive since thirst can 
cause anxiety.
The challenge to twentieth-century claims about universality in the biol-
ogy of emotional feeling initially came from criticism of the design of cross- 
cultural psychological studies that used photographs of posed facial expressions, 
which did not necessarily prove the case. They confirmed expressive capacity 
if not a fundamental biological sameness. In addition, it was recognized that in 
conforming to expectations for emotional expression within a society and to 
the rules governing observable expression, and separating skin changes from 
other physiological bodily change, even so-called biological emotional feel-
ings such as fear, anger and love, could be socially masked (Ekman 1999). The 
contradictions between involuntary physiological responses and associated 
drives including sexual drives versus socially induced responses were instead 
addressed by creating a division between basic primary emotional feelings – 
which vary in number from six to eight – and socially induced secondary 
emotional feelings. If this two-tiered separation complicates efforts to gener-
alize about the universality of emotions and emotional feelings, it offered a 
way forward in the division between natural biology versus culturally shaped 
feeling. By the mid-1990s, efforts to reconcile the divergent positions in the 
nature versus culture debates about the stimulation of emotional feeling were 
addressing complex questions about the biological intersections of emotional 
experience within social conditioning (Ekman and Davidson 1994). As he 
analyses categorization, James Averill asks: ‘[d]oes being basic refer to a log-
ical feature of a classification scheme, or does it also say something about the 
objects classified? I would argue in favour of the former, at least as far as emo-
tions are concerned’ (1994a: 7). Averill supports ideas of syndromes and argues 
that classificatory division between, for example, basic and social fear is, to 
some extent, arbitrary. The classifier’s interpretation is implicated in a process 
of general classification and of specific emotions.
The adherence to social rules in different cultures, however, did not com-
pletely satisfy the longstanding division in study of the emotions between 
a unifying universality and a separating cultural divergence. A significant 
schism emerged in the 1980s over the assumption that human emotional 
feelings are biologically natural as anthropological and other studies were 
finding cultural specificity beyond that of social rules for appropriate expres-
sion. Jan Plamper points out that travellers had written about cultural differ-
ence in feelings from the 1700s, and these were probed in twentieth-century 
anthropology by, for example, Clifford Geertz and Margaret Mead (2015: 80, 
81, 88). Studies during the 1980s began to centre on social constructivism. 
Anthropologist, Michelle Rosaldo (1980), progresses earlier disciplinary ideas 
about cultural expression by recognizing specific difference in actual feeling 
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and in the subjective experience of the body-self, together with recognition 
of the influence of the feelings of the researcher. Sociologist, Arlie Hochschild 
(1983), investigates the commercialization and management of emotions in 
Western culture by studying expectations that workers should feel the feel-
ings displayed within service industries, and her work establishes the fields 
that study the organization of emotions in the workplace and in the fam-
ily. Historians, Carol Stearns and Peter Stearns (1986), find noticeable social 
modification in the differing standards for the control of anger in the history 
of emotions. The cultural construction of emotional feeling and its mean-
ing also recognizes social divergence in gendered expression, and Catherine 
Lutz (1988) discerns unnatural emotions. Lutz recognizes that femininity is 
associated with emotional feeling in Western culture because of the public–
private split and gendered domestic sphere. This is not necessarily happening 
in other cultures where strong emotional feeling can be masculine, and not 
individualized, and that cultural practices vary for women (e.g. Abu-Lughod 
1986; Grima 1992; Lupton 1998). In circular reasoning, women in Western 
culture were historically attributed more awareness of emotions because of 
social expectations of gendered emotional sensitivity. Greater attention was 
accorded female self-feeling, and responsiveness to the feelings of others.
Culturally specific studies of emotional feeling diverge from scientific 
approaches investigating physiological emotional systems of the (animal) 
brain–body. Linguistic variation reveals that an emotion such as love in 
English has multiple words in other cultures that do not translate easily, and 
groupings of specific emotions vary, and a culture can emphasize some emo-
tions and not others. Margot Lyon (1995), however, argues for the centrality 
of the body and embodied power relations in the cultural analysis of emotion. 
Other research elaborates on some of the ways in which bodily feeling devel-
ops differently between cultures (e.g. Csordas 1994). Generalization about 
the biology of emotional feelings became problematic once studies began 
to recognize cultural difference in physiological responses (e.g. Jenkins and 
Valiente 1994). This raises the possibility that individual variability is com-
pounded by difference between cultures, and studies expose considerable 
variability in the experience of embodied feeling, and interpretations accom-
modate cultural, racial, gender and sexual differences by the late twentieth 
century. The politics of identity became integral to the analysis of difference 
in the emotions (e.g. Ahmed 2004).
The attribution of moral dimensions to the emotions, however, does 
show historical continuity in Western culture and continues to be viable. 
Even the effort to reconcile biological universalism and social constructiv-
ism may have antecedents in culture’s instability and moral inclusivity until 
the Enlightenment, when ideas of nature, the nonhuman animal and the 
environment became more clearly separated from the human (Thomas 1984; 
Plamper 2015: 5, 6). It remained possible to emphasize the social function of 
decision-making in relation to individual experiences of feeling, notably in 
the disciplines of philosophy and psychology (and theatre) that pose moral 
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questions about emotional responses (Goldie 2000; Parkinson, Fischer and 
Manstead 2005; Escolme 2014). A basic definition of feeling implies that it 
needs to be recognized by the self, and there is widespread acceptance that 
emotions are ‘intentional states’ about something (Goldie 2000; Parkinson, 
Fischer and Manstead 2005: 10). Behaviour associated with the emotions 
could be identified with moral norms among humans even though the social 
circumstances, language and bodily experience of love, anger and fear could 
differ greatly.
The developments outlined here argue for recognition of cultural devel-
opment and orientation within emotional responses. They suggest biol-
ogy is socially shaped with diverse capacities. The significance of identity 
difference – economic, gender, ethnic, racial and sexual – in the capacity for 
emotional feeling points to political ideas that implicitly challenge natural 
sameness and biological determinism. At the same time, recent neuropsycho-
logical research finds it difficult to establish consistent biological markers of 
universality, and finds that divergence is more apparent (Barrett 2018).
The twentieth-century intellectual effort to rethink oppositional discursive 
categories – such as culture/nature, masculine/feminine, mind/body – also 
involved the emotions and rational thought or reason (Lutz 1988). Challenges 
to binary categories highlight the low status of emotional feeling aligned 
with nature and femininity – a status evident in academic studies until the 
1980s, even with a selective focus on studying fear and aggression in nonhu-
man animals. If the recognition of cultural significance brought more clarity 
to the emotions, the function of thought and feeling remained obtuse until 
late-twentieth-century studies discerned that emotional feeling does more 
than influence cognition and may determine thought and belief (Frijda et al. 
2000a; Forgas 2000b). Subsequently affect theory expands on such possibili-
ties by recognizing that bodily sensation accompanies thought.
Theories about the cultural construction of emotion are particularly suited 
to creative and analytical practices in relation to literature, cinema and the-
atrical performance. Live and screen performance correspond readily with 
concepts of constructed emotion as performers and texts reproduce cultur-
ally recognizable emotions and emotional feelings. Accordingly, distinctions 
are made between emotional feeling and other types of feeling in the study 
of theatrical performance (e.g. Welton 2012) and in cinematic studies that 
contrast visceral sensation with an emotionally moving impact (Plantinga 
2009). An emotionally felt response in performance is caught up in a com-
plex process of translation when the performer does not feel that specific 
feeling. Linguistic studies highlight how spoken claims for emotional feeling 
encapsulate complexity in social understanding, and it is metaphors which 
often typify colloquial claims such as ‘feelings run through my body’ (see 
Chapter 3). Descriptions of emotion suggest sensations of movement.
The twentieth-century separation of the emotions and physiologies of 
emotional feeling is replicated in a bipartite distinction between cultur-
ally prescribed emotional feeling and nondiscursive affect. The varied and 
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confusing use of the word ‘affect’ in relation to ‘feeling’ and ‘emotional feel-
ing’ means that these two areas are separated in this discussion as far as pos-
sible. Theatrical performance reflects social languages as it contributes to 
them, and its impact arises from how the material elements are assembled, 
and together elicit less tangible responses, although it is often assumed that 
feeling is conveyed bodily with physical and spoken modes. In turn, spectator 
feeling involves bodily honed cognitive and sensory processes in response to 
theatrical languages and their interpretation. Performance and its analysis 
reflect the knowledge of, and beliefs about, bodily feeling that circulate in 
society. While the cultural shaping of emotional feeling aligns with artistic 
effect, affect is theorized as defying division, and therefore cultural intent, 
and modes of containment.
Affect currents
Despite an expanded concept of affect, a tendency to use ‘affect’ interchange-
ably to mean ‘emotional feeling’ persists. As Brian Massumi writes, ‘[a]ffect 
is most often used loosely as a synonym for emotion’ and to mean emotional 
feeling in representational forms as ‘qualified intensity’ (2002: 27, 28). He 
considers that affect should not be restricted to being a signifying form for 
the emotions (2002: 35). Massumi’s approach supports claims for process and 
motion, and because the theory of affect seeks to reflect the unities of matter 
and its energies rather than separation.
Teresa Brennan, however, defines affects as ‘the things that one feels’, using 
‘affect’ as a descriptive noun, a result of an unfolding active condition of feel-
ing (2004: 23). This distinction allows an affective process to happen bodily. 
But in her explanation of transmission, Brennan also argues against the way 
‘affect’ is used as the umbrella term for feeling and for ‘moods, sentiments, 
and emotions’ (2004: 5), and against making ‘affects’ and ‘emotional feelings’ 
interchangeable. Feelings interpret ‘sensory information’ and are sensations 
(Brennan 2004: 5). An awareness of affect can develop when resistance is 
encountered. Brennan’s analysis does have a specific application in therapeu-
tic engagement, even though ‘affect’ is less specific and more open-ended 
and Brennan suggests Freudian approaches have been more focused on drives 
than affects of felt sensation (2004: 34). Part of the reason for Brennan’s sep-
aration of affect from emotional feeling is to argue for affect’s permeabil-
ity and perceptibility and for an impersonal dimension within the physical 
space. Lauren Berlant accepts the Lacanian-influenced ideas of Brennan and 
Deleuzian-influenced ideas of Massumi to contend that ‘affective atmos-
pheres are shared, not solitary, and that bodies are continuously busy judg-
ing their environments and responding’ (2011: 15). Affect unifies embodied 
experience and the surroundings.
Affect theory reflects an effort to integrate the body and mind in the con-
nections between consciousness and physiology, to counteract their sepa-
ration. Brennan discerns that ‘the transmission of affect’ has interpersonal 
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dimensions but that ‘no-one really knows how it happens’ in the convergence 
of social, psychological and physiological factors (2004: 2). Brennan claims it 
is ‘socially induced affect that changes our biology’ (2004: 1, 2). It is clearly 
intersubjective, even contagious, in Brennan’s approach (2004: 67). This pro-
cess is similar to, but not the same as ‘nervous entrainment’, when one nerv-
ous system impacts on another (Brennan 2004: 70, 71).
A philosophical impulse to encompass the energetic dynamism that sur-
rounds and moves across bodies and material forms reflects what is scien-
tifically known about the movement and action of the particle world. The 
approach rescinds separation with ‘resonating levels’ of ‘mind and body’, 
‘volition and cognition’, ‘expectation and suspense, body depth and epider-
mis, past and future, action and reaction, happiness and sadness, quiescence 
and arousal, passivity and activity’ and finds a ‘point of emergence’ and a 
‘vanishing point’ in affect (Massumi 2002: 33). Affect can be grasped through 
intersecting layers, levels and energies.
As Stephanie Trigg (2016) explains, affect accounts for an encompassing 
flow of feeling that is not reliant on awareness or communication. Instead 
unifying affect refers to the ‘embodied, sensate aspect of mental and emo-
tional activity’ that can be given ‘ontological priority’ as ‘bodily, cerebral 
or endocrinal activity’ (blushing) and can be applied also to a ‘network of 
forces’, including drives and motivations, and be indicative of ‘collective social 
feeling’ (Trigg 2016: 49, 50). Even though affect is not reliant on thought, the 
philosophical trajectory goes back through Bergson’s concept of an inhibiting 
consciousness combined with Spinoza’s explanation of how ‘it is only when 
the idea of the affection is doubled by an idea of the idea of the affection that it 
attains the level of conscious reflection’ (Massumi 2002: 31, italics in original).
In response to Deleuze’s idea of affect, Massumi concurs that ‘intensity 
will be equated with affect’ and suggests it provides a way of thinking about 
how sensation is experienced (2002: 27). Even as it defies (or resists) language 
and potentially eludes comprehension, affect coincides with material culture. 
Affect can infer a link between the electric impulses of the human brain and 
electrified circuits although gauging intensity suggests a comparative inter-
pretation and relational positioning. It remains unclear if receptivity to affect 
is biologically inherent and/or developed through cultural conditioning – as 
is argued about emotional feeling.
Importantly, Massumi argues that affective feeling is real and that affect is 
fundamental to understanding social engagement and virtual worlds in the 
twenty-first century (2002: 42). He argues for the movement of intangible 
affect in a political context and expressly so in later work (Massumi 2010). 
The designation of unstructured affect that may have a political impact is 
intriguing because it implies affect coincides with a purposeful effect if not 
control of the material surroundings.
In summary, affect is the result of an affective process. On the one hand, 
affect is being used to explain embodied sensation, and sensitivity to human 
and communal feeling and to an atmosphere, a shared environment. On the 
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other hand, affect theory locates the human body within larger currents and 
flows moving across and through material domains and entities, so affect is 
impersonal and indicates an inseparable connection with the surroundings. 
Both conceptualizations involve intensity even though intensity presumes 
recognizing increased strength. The second conceptualization extends affect 
beyond human worlds – that is, affect is nonhuman. It suggests an affective 
condition that is omnipresent. Clearly affect is being used for intangible quali-
ties within life. The ways in which affect is gauged through bodily sensation in 
the first conceptualization seem more applicable to the contained experience 
of theatrical performance, while allowing for its depiction of the more abstract 
second conceptualization of nonhuman affect and its unifying potential.
Although they eschew a generalized theory of affect, nonetheless Gregory 
Seigworth and Melissa Gregg offer a Deleuzian-inspired description of 
affect as happening through ‘intensities that pass body to body (human, 
nonhuman …)’ in relation to an ontological idea of becoming (2010: 1). They 
write that affect happens (shimmers) through ‘in between-ness: in the capacities 
to act and be acted upon’ (Seigworth and Gregg 2010: 1). Affect can arise 
between bodies, in body-to-body exchanges and intruding in fleeting or 
sustained ways as ‘intensities’ which can be ‘visceral forces’ rather than ‘con-
scious knowing’ (Seigworth and Gregg 2010: 1). Affect offers a comprehen-
sive idea of the energetic dimensions of human life if not expressly also in the 
effort of thinking. It moves through ‘intracellular divulgences of sinew, tis-
sue, and gut economies, and the vaporous evanescences of the incorporeal’ as 
a life force equivalent but one also evident in decomposition (Seigworth and 
Gregg 2010: 2). This use of affect to mean bodily life encourages a myriad 
of open-ended interpretations. Seigworth and Gregg break down theoreti-
cal approaches and theorists of affect into eight categories while acknowl-
edging that affect theory attempts to get beyond categorization (2010: 6–8). 
Emotions and emotional feelings are relegated to one category. (Can emo-
tional feeling be contained in this way?) Affect theory is less concerned with 
human subject–object relations as it offers a unified sense of a world.
An active energetic flow of affect exists outside self-generated feeling. The 
immensity of this generalized condition of affect corresponds with devel-
opments in scientific understanding of the inorganic and organic world and 
twenty-first-century technological advances. Recent affect theory offers a 
philosophical approach that situates humans within the energetic realm of physics 
and processes of constant exchange within biological matter. This seems crucially 
important for challenging the belief that the human is separate from the 
nonhuman world.
Contested intentions
Poststructuralist approaches that encompass sensate feeling seek to replace 
the separation of thought and feeling with affective fluidity. Affect theory 
proposes unification as it points to a theory of everything.
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Ruth Leys (2011; 2018) argues, however, that unexamined assumptions 
within the theory of affect need to be unravelled because these undermine 
claims for political efficacy and challenges to power. Leys brings the discus-
sion of affect back to disciplinary distinctions as she argues that the division 
between universal versus constructed emotion reappears in another guise in 
recent affect theory as anti-intention versus intention. Therefore affect the-
ory offers an alternative to, rather than a resolution of, the polarized divisions 
of nature versus culture carrying over from the twentieth century. Affect is 
not only uncontrollable, but it is also happening beyond the level of conscious 
awareness. It is subliminal and potentially outside even the cognitive percep-
tion nominated by appraisal theory. Cognitive deliberation or intention as 
it is experienced and thought becomes subordinate to a noncognitive realm 
without intention (Leys 2018). There is a philosophical argument for an 
intentional process even at an evolutionary biological level that is acknowl-
edged as either descriptive or directive, and the overall implicit intention is 
survival (Price 2015: 109, 110).
Leys’s criticisms become relevant to interpretations of affect in perfor-
mance. While live performance elicits felt responses alongside cognitive 
ones, it is artistic intention that elicits spectator attention or at least orientates 
it. Artistic forms are purposeful.
Leys is pointing out that the discussion of affect in the humanities seems to 
be replicating the older position of unthinking emotionally felt responses – 
also associated with nonhuman animals. The concept of a general dynamic 
field that influences behaviour without cognitive intervention seems to 
work against its social efficacy, and Leys’s political criticisms echo Hannah 
Arendt’s (and Brecht’s) critical emphasis on reason over emotional feeling 
(see Chapter 5). Affect theory about the flows and energetic movement at a 
cellular level encompasses human bodies but presupposes felt responses out-
side comprehension. Body–brain chemical reactions that are not consciously 
perceived remain susceptible to being controlled. Moreover, Leys is arguing 
that affect theory aligns with the earlier twentieth-century presumption that 
basic emotional feelings are biologically hard-wired. In considering scientific 
sources presented in affect theory, Leys (2011) notes the absence of a range 
of disciplinary paradigms on feeling. She summarizes the recent position of 
affect studies as: ‘The claim is that we human beings are corporeal creatures 
imbued with subliminal affective intensities and resonances that so decisively 
influence or condition our political and other beliefs that we ignore those 
affective intensities and resonances at our peril – not only because doing so 
leads us to underestimate the political harm that the deliberate manipulation 
of our affective lives can do’ (Leys 2011: 436). Leys finds affect implicitly 
outlines an idea of universal unknowing.
Leys (2018) suggests affect theory aligns with scientific study that is uni-
versalist in its unifying precepts. Processes of feeling that have been prior-
itized since James can imply involuntary physiological responses. Leys tracks 
the influence of Darwin, James and Silvan Tomkins’s noncognitive affect 
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research on Paul Ekman, Carroll Izard and Paul Griffiths, and opposing 
views coming from Rom Harré, Robert Solomon, Martha Nussbaum and 
Richard Lazarus advocating the ‘intentionality of the emotions’ (2018: 5). 
The work of these influential researchers from different disciplines is being 
located within twentieth-century debates about constructed versus natural 
emotions. The arguments revolve around what are termed ‘subpersonal’ bod-
ily processes and reflexes and feelings that do not seem to have causes and 
animal science about the limbic brain and the amygdala (Leys 2018: 6). While 
the universalist position recognizes cultural pluralism, it unifies human phys-
iology. Leys argues that it omits ‘intentionality’, the evaluative, and rational 
cognition, belief and desire in feeling (Leys 2018: 9).
In a somewhat provocative grouping, Damasio’s neuroscientific approach 
is grouped with the approach of Tomkins, who describes innate emotional 
capacity but recognizes culturally learned scripts, and with Ekman’s research 
on the facial recognition of basic emotions and social rules. Then Leys sug-
gests that these coincide with the Deleuzian-derived approach to affect which 
functions in dialogue with science because there is a ‘shared anti-intentionalism’ 
(2011: 443, italics in original). Leys argues: ‘What the new affect theorists 
and the neuroscientists share is a commitment to the idea that there is a gap 
between the subject’s affects and its cognition or appraisal of the affective 
situation or object, such that its cognition and thinking comes “too late” 
for reasons, beliefs, intentions, and meanings to play the role in action and 
behaviour usually accorded to them’ (2011: 443). Leys warns that the con-
cept of affect has echoes of the objective or neutral mid- twentieth-century 
science that potentially allows for sectarian interference and social manipu-
lation. Yet cultural factors are recognized in scientific ideas and Damasio’s 
(2004) approach makes a distinction between the emotions and physiological 
emotional feeling in scientific study. These approaches seem more nuanced 
than Leys’s grouping implies.
Certainly, a singular concept of affect, which is outside awareness, 
detracts from the scope of conscious processes. As well, the redemptive pos-
sibility of consciously changing or forestalling emotionally felt responses 
becomes obscured in the broad energetic framework of affect theory. Leys 
is making the point that subliminal affect and ‘affective processes occur 
independently of intention or meaning’ as ‘nonintentional, bodily reac-
tions’ (2011: 437). This brings to the fore the longstanding concern with 
sequencing in studies of emotions and emotional feeling (also see Chapter 
3). The rethinking of affect can be compared with how ‘appraisal theorists’ 
nominate the importance of orientation towards stimuli and habituated 
patterns of attention to what are termed objects in the world and the rapid 
engagement that determines felt responses (Leys 2011: 437). But when 
affect is considered to underlie all other felt responses, Leys argues, recent 
theoretical scholarship may have inadvertently become aligned with ideas 
of involuntary responses like those evident prior to the advent of appraisal 
theory.
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Lisa Blackman reiterates that ‘“the turn to affect” is often positioned as a 
counter to the psychological subject’ and bypasses cognition and emotional 
feeling (Blackman 2012: 15). She explains that affect theory reflects a trend of 
theorizing the ‘affective energies and creative motion’ of the body and char-
acterizes bodies ‘by movement and process’ (Blackman 2012: 1). Ideas of the 
body expanded concepts of a natural entity towards the end of the twentieth 
century, so that a fixed singular body was reframed as porous and unstable. 
In supporting affect theory, Blackman identifies, however, that there are con-
tradictory tensions since ‘our theorizations of affect require attending to the 
models of subjectivity that we implicitly and sometimes explicitly invoke’ 
(2012: 1).
Explanations of affective bodily feeling encompass sensory responses, but 
reject a subjective centre. Leys (2018) suggests that the notion of sensing can 
be more developed, and she argues that embodied cognition is embedded 
within the world and inseparable from sensory engagement. According to 
Leys, the body within affect theory is described as being governed by ‘affec-
tive intensities and resonances’ independent of ideology and carried along by 
a ‘formless, unstructured, nonsignifying force or “intensity”’ that is preper-
sonal or subpersonal (2018: 309, 313). She disputes the idea of an ungoverned 
body and its ‘action and behaviour’ happening outside ‘mindedness’ (Leys 
2018: 315). Another point of divergence for intentional versus nonintentional 
revolves on whether embodied responses involve accumulated experience 
and understanding, and Leys is concerned with what affect means for human 
capacity for accumulated social development and political change in general.
The use of affect in relation to performance needs clarification since affect 
theory can seem at odds with artistic intention and political purpose. Affect’s 
unifying function needs to be reconciled with how a specific performance 
intentionally draws spectator attention, and rehearses socio-political possi-
bilities. Therefore affect is being distinguished here from the emotions and 
emotional feeling that reflect intention. A process of recognizing affect in 
performance invariably juxtaposes an all-pervasive effect with bodily sen-
sation. As argued, however, there is great value in the conceptualization of 
affect that unifies human and nonhuman.
Live – in theory
It is the capacity of sensory perception to connect feeling and intentional 
social meaning that is at stake with the interpretation of affect theory in per-
formance (e.g. Di Benedetto 2010; Alston 2016). While intention does not 
directly equate with thought in theatrical performance, it does imply a delib-
erate artistic perspective. Affect does not presume an intentional directed 
effect, which raises a concern that affect may be unverifiable for performance. 
Even as the analysis of performance refers to science about the brain–body, 
affect refers to a wider general field of movement around the body. Moreover 
affect’s receptive body seems different to a responsive body-self, so that both 
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affect and emotional feeling remain feasible in an explanation of political 
meaning in theatrical performance. In accepting Leys’s criticisms, affect 
might instead sit alongside emotional feeling in performance rather than 
supersede it. Affect can usefully broaden how performance is interpreted, for 
example, in acknowledging bodily pulses and surrounding energetic effects. 
Importantly, an aspect of affect’s conceptualization suggests how thought can 
be accompanied by bodily sensation and vice versa.
The materiality of Uncanny Valley was more akin to the assemblage that Jen 
Harvie describes being created by ‘an actor-network’ of performers, audiences, 
directors, designers and ‘technical crew’, a network process indicative of Bruno 
Latour’s actor-network of social processes in lieu of one block entity called society 
(or theatre) (2013: 17). Spectators responded to what was assembled during the 
performance although there is a difference between responding to a fully auto-
mated robot and an electronic ‘puppet’ with human operators. Uncanny Valley 
described Turing’s test to distinguish a human and a machine as the production 
brought to mind a wide range of twenty-first-century discourse about artificial 
intelligence and machines replacing humans. The production reflected the well- 
established relationship between performance and science (e.g. Shepherd-Barr 
2006). Its analysis points to the turn to cognitive science in performance studies 
(e.g. McConachie and Hart 2006a). It also assumed some familiarity with dis-
cursive knowledge about nonhuman technological development, which under-
pins innovative contemporary performance (Parker-Starbuck 2011).
Uncanny Valley raises philosophical questions about what it means to be 
energetically alive versus biologically alive, which might seem a relatively 
straightforward issue of the material composition of a body shape until exist-
ing theoretical approaches to live performance are incorporated. Performance 
analysis encompasses three broad areas that span: textual and artistic produc-
tion; the audience reception; and performer training. While artistic produc-
tion and training can be described as putting theory into practice – artistic 
praxis – commentary on the reception of performance reverses this process 
by theorizing about practice and its meaning. Theory can encompass theatre 
in general and a specific production, although commentary that reiterates 
general principles without a specific performance remains a performance of 
theory. It might be applicable to every theatrical performance or none.
Performance analysis draws widely on discursive theory and philosophy from 
other disciplines, including neuroscience, to illuminate the way performance 
and socio-political worlds intersect (e.g. Striff 2003; Falletti, Sofia and Jacono 
2017). Janelle Reinelt and Joseph Roach recognize a dialectic process in dis-
cursive applications of ‘theory versus practice, history versus theory, dramatic 
text versus stage performance’ in relation to differing artistic forms of perfor-
mance and their interpretation (1992b: 3). Innovative and original discursive 
perspectives within performance converge and align with shifts in philosophi-
cal thinking (Auslander 2003). This works well – in performance theory.
The assembled aesthetic and embodied components of live and screen per-
formance can be read discursively like a text (Phelan 1993; 2012). While 
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performance studies confirm discursive capacity, the inclusion of affective 
impact in this process is complicated by an argument as to whether affect 
is discursive (see Introduction). Moreover a paradigm of dispersed, socially 
shaped patterns of interpretation is well recognized in audience reception 
theory (e.g. Bennett 1990; Dolan 2008). The impact of performance will 
vary according to the economic, racial, sexual and gender experience of a 
spectator, the cultural background – and discursive knowledge about robots. 
Accordingly, the recognition of cultural difference assumes that responses 
are subjective and specific to an individual spectator. At the same time, tech-
nologically driven performance presents a multiplicity of subject-bodies and 
inner and outer surfaces that Jennifer Parker-Starbuck finds disrupt ‘the idea 
of a unitary subject’ even as it elicits affect through its effects (2011: 155). 
Discursive theory about performance recognizes unities, separations and sub-
jectivities in the interpretation of the text.
Performance theory also recognizes that a general live quality encapsulates 
the experience of the present moment of performance that unfolds to become a 
type of ‘disappearance of its own enactment’ (Phelan 1993: 115; Causey 2006; 
Parker-Starbuck 2011). The live experience of a performance cannot be exactly 
repeated. While repetition underpins the artistic making and presentation of 
theatrical performance, it is a momentum of time passing that is being theo-
rized in its live reception. Performance theory points to an ontology of living 
in an unfolding present. Live art also accommodates filmed performance and 
documented work (Heathfield 2004), in the way a recorded performance or 
photograph is viewed live (Phelan 2012). A general quality of liveness emerges 
within performance. It equates with bodily sensations of aliveness. Performance 
theory about live is consistent with Jane Bennett’s (2010) ‘vital materialism’, 
and Mel Chen’s (2012) ‘animacy’ contrasted with the inanimate and deadness.
Liveness in performance seems to overlap with theory about affect in the 
reception of Uncanny Valley. It was received live, but the robot performer was 
not a living entity. The robot was, however, energized, and capable of induc-
ing viewer affect. In asking if machines can perform, Philip Auslander claims 
that a humanoid robot belongs in a historical tradition of automata in the-
atre, given that much performance is repetitive routine, and a machine can 
‘possess technical performance skills’ but not ‘interpretative skills’ (2006: 91). 
While the robot in Uncanny Valley was received as a human substitute, it was 
not generic since it replicated a specific body. A human actor was replaced. 
Melle ostensibly chose to duplicate himself with a ‘puppet’ to deal with the 
demand for personal appearances after he published a fictional book about 
bipolar based on his own experience. The robot prefigured both Melle’s per-
sonal liberation and the obliteration of the human performer. The production 
pointed to a longstanding cultural fascination with automatism in perfor-
mance as well as its capacity to induce anxiety (Goodall 2008). The robot 
raised ethical concerns about replacing the living performer through both its 
cognitive content and its unsettling sensory impact. The three-dimensional 
double rescinded the unique value of the live human in performance.
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The uncanny feeling impacted on thought. Uncanny Valley exposed the 
machinery at the back of the human-like Melle robot for the live audience 
to view after the performance. The electrified circuitry of the robot’s head 
could be contrasted with ideas of the chemical electrical impulses of a bio-
logical brain. The Rimini Protokoll mechanism was not hidden, in contrast 
to that of the robot actor in Japan’s Seinendan Theatre Company production, 
Sayonara: Android–Human Theatre, a collaboration with Professor Hiroshi 
Ishiguro, in which a robotic female form was the carer of a terminally ill 
young woman in Oriza Hirata’s play. As I viewed this production live in 
August 2011 at Osaka University with colleagues, I had to keep reminding 
myself that I was watching a robot during the performance as I responded 
to the human-like performance of emotional behaviour. The female robot 
seemed to care. I felt with her. Performance theory can interpret energetic 
bodies and surfaces and align with affect theory, and avoid concepts of sub-
jectivity and felt experience. But I could not ignore the way I responded with 
feeling to the Sayonara robot’s caring demeanour as if this was happening 
separately from cognitively knowing that I was viewing a robot. There were 
numerous possibilities for interpreting Rimini Protokoll’s theatrical produc-
tion in relation to theatre as an industry, and the nonhuman robot shapes in 
European industry versus the Japanese development of the humanoid robot 
for the caring and sex industries, and such interpretations need not acknowl-
edge sensory feeling. Seinendan’s robot imitated a bodily demeanour to pass 
as human while the visible wiring of Rimini Protokoll’s robot was exposed 
at the end. Seinendan’s robot simulated theatre’s feeling self while Uncanny 
Valley emphasized the disappearance of the live self.
It was the absence of performer aliveness in Uncanny Valley that coin-
cided with the uncanny. It prompted the question: to what extent does the 
energetic dimension of performance rely on a spectator’s bodily perception? 
The sensory experience of performance is a foundational general condition 
that becomes differentiated by specific productions and contexts (e.g. Di 
Benedetto 2010). The Melle double visibly evoked a sense of strangeness with 
its electrified circuitry. But the interpretation exposes a premise of relational 
positioning: the technological robot viewed by the live human. It denotes 
bodily sensitivity to a nonhuman entity, which is conceptualized as receptiv-
ity to affect. This receptivity concurs with other descriptions of affect (e.g. 
Alston 2016; Blackman 2012). The intangible qualities of live and uncanny 
affect that are accessible and shareable in performance are also then linked to 
its socio-political interpretation.
Affect theory aligns with performance theory about a live quality. But 
performance forms emanate additional intangible qualities such as those of 
aesthetic mood. Insofar as mood intersects with a general condition of affect, 
it is a particular mood that is artistically crafted in performance. Affect the-
ory proposes a mutable condition that is energetically sharable and therefore 
intersecting with, but varying from, the artistically directed qualities of the-
atrical performance.
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Impersonal affect and personal feeling
The electrified robot in Uncanny Valley might have elicited bodily affect as 
well as an emotional response such as admiration for the replication of Melle’s 
physical appearance. A viewer’s bodily response to electronic forms (and in 
online viewing) might be barely distinguishable from viewer admiration, 
which differs again from sensations of thought and emotional responses to the 
biographies of Melle and Turing. In addition, the robot was identity specific 
in race, gender, nationality and age. As the Rimini Protokoll production 
evoked affect, it invited subjective responses to a specific human identity. 
Uncanny Valley suggested that impersonal affect and personal emotional feel-
ing are coexistent.
Affect theory is invaluable for thinking about how theatrical performance 
presents human to nonhuman significance within a wider domain. The 
conception of affect refers to an expansive energetic flow that aligns with 
Figure 1.2 Rimini Protokoll (2018), Uncanny Valley. Photographer, Gabriela Neeb.
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twenty-first-century knowledge and scientific explanations of atomic motion 
and energetic fields. It denotes a general aliveness of matter as it reveals the 
underlying interconnection and processes of exchange happening within the 
environment, whether visible to humans or not. Impersonal affect delineates 
motion between intangible and material elements; affect’s fluidity is dynamic.
It is the issue of human perception of affect that complicates affect theory 
about the body and active processes. If affect denotes the bodily ‘registers of 
experience’ that are intangible, unconscious, ‘trans-subjective’ and ‘imper-
sonal’, where is the human self located (Blackman 2012: 2, 3)? As it eschews a 
subjective centre, impersonal affect sets up a contradictory tension with a per-
sonal self. In outlining how Clough’s emphasis is technological and includes 
the biomediated body, Blackman brings the psyche and psychological into her 
discussion. She is considering body-schema versus body image; that is, how a 
body feels in contrast to how it looks. She finds that ‘body-without-an-image 
is important for refocusing on bodies’ as processes, and even though ‘affect 
does not require a subject’ (Blackman 2012: 11, 15). (But does an acknowl-
edgement of intensity presuppose subjectivity?) Blackman argues that psycho-
logical subjectivity can manifest an aspect of an affective process through, for 
example, the placebo effect or hypnosis. A sense of the uncanny can be added.
Performance that presents character psychology implies subjectivity as it 
invites personal responses from spectators so the possibility of impersonal 
affect is clearest in the absence of emotional psychologies. As explained, while 
the robot in Uncanny Valley is not performing emotional feeling, there is the 
potential for personal responses to Melle’s and Turing’s experiences. The dis-
tinction illustrates that a concept of impersonal affect and its processes cannot 
accommodate all felt experience during a performance. Impersonal affect 
implies a quality of sameness – in theory – whereas live performance con-
tains diversity in its specific identities and aesthetic qualities. Adam Alston 
explains that affect theory ‘is unable to account for the manipulation of affect 
production, or for the agency and cooperative endeavour’ in performance 
which also has biographical significance (2016: 42). The diversity of inten-
tions and responses needs to be recognized. At the same time, the collective 
entity of an audience in a theatre space generates an accumulated effect that 
seems impersonal–although two thousand audience members elicit a differ-
ent effect to a hundred. Yet the recognition of the gender, sexual and race 
identities of performers and of spectators also presumes divergent subjective 
and personal experience so a theoretical generalization about feeling in per-
formance distorts, even negates, difference.
Performance can evoke bodily sensation that seems impersonal when it is an 
involuntary response. But a claim for an impersonal effect reiterates the diffi-
culty that besets interpretation; did the other viewers have similar responses? 
The 2007 Licking Dogs online performances by Angela Bartram presented 
the human performer and a dog, head to head, licking each other for about 
ten minutes. Licking Dogs was both fascinating and disturbing because of the 
two different body forms in the sustained intimate action of mouth-to-mouth 
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contact. Bartram points out that in performance, ‘the performer’s “human” 
familiarity allows the observer to connect with, and understand the effect of 
the event’ through ‘living in a similar body’ (2012: 103). The sensory process 
of viewing implicated the substitution of one’s own body into the action. It 
involved phenomenological perception that could make a human viewer aware 
of his or her (their) tongue or breathing and other sensations and vulnerability. 
The body-to-body sensory effect of Licking Dogs was challenging to view. As 
well as exploring notions of intimacy and its taboos, Bartram is interested in 
the animalizing effect of working in close proximity with a nonhuman ani-
mal. The positioning of the dog’s body upsets notions of species separation as 
Bartram’s performance played with how humans and their pets interact emo-
tionally and with kisses and licks but its intentional sustained spatial practice 
became transgressive. The performance had an impersonal visceral impact as 
it evoked a personal human (and dog) response, even squeamishness.
The viewing of the body of another species happened physically and sen-
sorily and potentially also aroused sensations associated with smell and taste 
even as the sequencing of feeling and self-awareness remains open to con-
jecture. The process also seemed personal. Alston explains that being viscer-
ally ‘affected’ within environments implicates ‘cognition and corporeality’ 
but also ‘intuitive and/or idiosyncratic’ responses (2016: 42). He describes a 
‘“biopolitics”’ of affect in immersive performance based on personal experi-
ence that separates and ‘promotes “towardness or awayness” from something 
or someone’ in Sara Ahmed’s conceptualization (2016: 43, 46). Impersonal 
affect coincides with personal feeling in turning away from or towards the 
action in Licking Dogs.
The recognition of impersonal affect alongside personal feeling is part of 
the effort in this analysis to reconcile a general form with a specific instance, 
and social language with a subjectively felt response. Impersonal affect in 
performance need not negate personal responses even as it implies a general 
condition. Impersonal flows in performance surround form(s) as well as con-
nect with bodily sensation even though attunement to a general condition of 
affect might be fleeting. A specific (dog) body in Licking Dogs, for example, 
would seem to interrupt the free flow of affect.
Ideas of impersonal affective flow challenge belief in the separation of 
human and nonhuman and denote connection. But nonhuman affect could 
arguably also exist in an empty physical space, when it is not reliant on any-
one in attendance. This might be an acceptable conclusion for affect theory 
but not for live performance practice. Instead performance reveals how an 
impersonal all-pervasive affect intersects with embodied responses.
Presence and transmission
While artistic synthesis and deliberate calculation create the complex physical 
and metaphorical spaces that evoke audience feeling, such energetic effects in 
performance are unreliable. The pulsations that energized the Uncanny Valley 
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robot may not have been felt. Spectator responses to theatrical performance 
are variable and an acknowledgement of affect might be insufficient to claim 
a collective experience. The combined aesthetic elements generate widely 
differing responses in their reception.
Performers reach out to audiences in energetic ways that are often described 
with an acknowledgment of ‘presence’. To what extent does a performer 
inhabit an intermediary zone between general affect and subjective feeling? 
Jane Goodall explains that ‘the evolution of a poetics of presence’ and ‘imag-
istic language in which presence is evoked in different cultural and histor-
ical contexts’ can be summarized as ‘“sensing” a presence’ (2008: 7). She 
finds that commentaries describe an energetic exchange between performers 
and audiences, and ‘presence’ denotes a connective force within live theatre. 
This intangible quality originates with a performer on stage. Theatrical pres-
ence encompasses simultaneous dualities of real and fictional, and physical 
and imaginative spaces, and a perception that a performer with presence can 
make a stage space seem full (Goodall 2008: 9, 16). While the performer in 
front of an audience initiates energetic contact and transmission, audience 
responses facilitate the engagement. It can be a sexually charged engagement. 
Goodall writes of two types of historical explanation: one derived from 
‘regimes of training and technical prowess: elocution and vocal technique’ 
with movement, and ‘more mysterious qualities of magnetism and mesmer-
ism’ (2008: 8). A central tenet of live performance is dynamism between 
performer and audience in an aural and visual energetic two-way exchange. 
Hans Gumbrecht also includes ‘touch’ in the way presence arises in relation-
ship to objects (2012: 6, 7). A sense of touch without contact points to the 
convergence of the senses in processes of reaching out in theatre. Yet Phelan 
explains that presence also prefigures doubt about its recognition (1993: 115). 
Presence would seem to align with the bodily sensations of affect, even as it 
originates in an individually specific and intentional performance, one also 
involving emotional expression.
The challenge of explaining presence in performance theory illuminates 
the difficulty of quantifying what is felt by an audience. But presence is more 
than a subjectively felt response. Joseph Roach (2007) describes a deperson-
alized quality he calls ‘it’ that is evident in the popular draw of celebrities 
including actors historically who exhibit a type of intensity through the wide 
appeal of their physical appearance. The demonstration of ‘it’ emerges from 
historical records about an individual performer recognized for his or her 
popularity. Roach writes that ‘[t]heatrical performance and the social per-
formances that resemble it consist of struggle, the simultaneous experience 
of mutually exclusive possibilities – truth and illusion, presence and absence, 
face and mask’ (2007: 9). It is contradictory tensions of stage presence and 
theatrical dualities that create dynamism and attract attention, and encourage 
audience attentiveness, making a quality of ‘it’ apparent. Roach discerns that 
the intensity of ‘it’ has ‘singularity and typicality’, which create resistances 
and ‘reversible polarities’ (2007: 8, 9, italics in original). The quality of ‘it’ 
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is a depersonalized effect of the contradictory tensions created by specific 
presence in performance.
Goodall and Roach confirm presence through corroborating accounts 
by performers, critics and spectators that imply intensity and recognize an 
appeal that includes the emotional expression and material staging such as 
the costuming. Emotional expression in performance encourages a unified 
audience response as a combination of human and nonhuman stage elements 
contribute to performer presence.
The concepts of ‘presence’ and ‘it’ in performance bring to the fore a zone 
of contact between artistic intention and spectator attention. At best, pres-
ence indicates an undivided attentiveness of the live audience that perform-
ers recognize happens for a few moments. Goodall’s ‘presence’ and Roach’s 
‘it’ become recognizable through a dualistic and contradictory impact that 
makes theatrical effects compelling. The power over an audience suggests 
Foucault’s ideas of the internalization of power in a spatial and perceptual 
exchange between spectator and performer. A political meaning emerges 
from the power to be taken over by (theatrical) presence and this process 
corresponds with how affect can be apprehended as political (Massumi 2010).
Presence in performance seems compatible with affective energetic flow. 
But Uncanny Valley confirmed that nonhuman objects and materials also 
draw audience attention – an idea that was reinforced with a mobile spotlight 
as a ‘theatre machine’ with the literal capacity to focus attention. Technology 
and objects in performance show how energetic presence can be impersonal. 
The energetic presence of human performers, however, arises in conjunction 
with, but is not the same as, emotional feeling. It suggests that affect and 
emotional feeling coexist even as personal presence becomes depersonalized.
Resistance
Licking Dogs points to resistance in the affect surrounding human to nonhu-
man action. Brennan explains that the transmission of affective feeling takes 
place when someone absorbs the energetic feeling of another (2004: 3). Or, 
alternatively, transmission does not happen when it encounters resistance. 
Brennan uses affect transmission to expand on ideas of projection, transfer-
ence and intersubjectivity; for example, a mother seeking to share the child’s 
experience. She also suggests that smell underlies the transmission of affect, 
so it is also chemical ‘entrainment’ and involves sensory responses (Brennan 
2004: 68). But this approach to affect suggests resistance can arise in the sensi-
tivity to material practices and human presence, in a refusal to be taken over.
An idea of affect circulating between and around bodies aligns with long-
standing ideas about emotional feeling spreading and becoming contagious 
that track back to Henri Bergson. It matters that emotional feeling can be 
induced by the feeling of others when, as Ahmed (2004) explains, polit-
ical change can be based on circulating emotional responses, and spread 
from body to body and within a group. Affect has what Guattari suggests 
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is a ‘sticky’ quality, and it moves around with stickiness (1996: 158). By com-
parison, Nicola Shaughnessy explains how grief in performance transmits 
with Brennan’s idea of ‘“catchiness”’(2019: 34). Sticky affect and the catching 
of feeling reflect how these are perceived – and might be scientifically veri-
fied in the future.
In her evaluation of Raymond Williams’s feeling structures, Berlant recog-
nizes that these may not transmit (2011: 65). Performance is ineffective when 
it does not engage the viewer, although flatness in performance can also 
annoy and have an emotional effect. In relation to reader engagement with 
literature, Susan Feagin explains that the ‘absence of a systematically developed 
vocabulary to identify feelings is explicable not because they are “pure phe-
nomenology” (whatever that might be), whose varieties are hard to capture in 
a systematic way, but because of the variability and complexity of the cogni-
tions, perceptions, and apprehensions that are embedded within them’ (2012: 
648, italics in original). The reader’s pleasures include heightened bodily 
sensation as the text (briefly) absorbs and transfers attention to an associated 
reality or an escapist one, and Feagin points to the way a reader’s engagement 
is compounded by previous experience of reading texts. Personal experience 
connects with an artistic form that becomes depersonalized in its social cir-
culation. A reader/spectator can also resist with feeling; accounting for the 
diverse perspectives of an audience group seems even more complicated.
A concept of ‘disinterest’ in live performance might imply resistance or 
neutrality or separation. Performance flatness and spectator disinterest under-
mine a general claim for performance reception and presence. Alston, how-
ever, contends that such disinterest and distancing are not feasible within 
recent immersive theatre that fuses ‘sense-as-feeling and sense-as-meaning’ 
and implicates a ‘“greatest storm of emotions”’ (2016: 47–49). This type of 
performance involves spectators moving around in the physical space rather 
than being spatially segregated from the performers.
The analysis of affect in performance encounters the dynamism of the art 
form, which is conceivably shared in the sense that it is collaboratively created 
and takes place in the company of others. As subjective reception disrupts 
a presumption of common experience, a claim for a collective or commu-
nal response remains speculative. It is unclear, for example, why some spec-
tators hesitated as they approached the robot form of Thomas Melle after 
the performance. The generalization about audience responses expanded 
with late-twentieth-century mapping of neurophysiological capacity that at 
least confirm long-held suppositions about embodied knowledge and well- 
established practices within performance training (Kemp 2012). Despite the 
ubiquitous foundational and questionable animal laboratory studies, neurosci-
entific investigation of responses to stimuli confirms physiological principles. 
For example, Gerald Edelman elaborates on William James’s ideas of con-
sciousness by proposing that input and neural activity simultaneously create the 
‘phenomenal transform’, the human ‘qualia’ (2000: 77, 78). Once an activity 
or response is consciously learned, it becomes automatic (Edelman 2000: 93). 
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The understanding of physiological timing has been refined through neu-
roscientific research that offers a general explanation of brain processes. But 
it does not account for the individual ‘I’ of the person and diverse responses. 
Explanations of how different areas of the brain connect with bodily feeling 
have not resolved the larger argument that physiological reactions are individ-
ually shaped within culture. (Can the fMRI (functional magnetic resonance 
imaging) brain scan be fooled by a mastery of bodily feeling – by an actor’s 
skill?) Instead, the proposition that embodied responsiveness develops differ-
ently through orientation within the world can incorporate performance as it 
potentially disrupts bodily responses that have become automatic.
Live presence and affect theory both nominate a quality of intensity. But 
intensity in performance suggests progression as performer presence points to 
an intensity that might or might not be apprehended along with the recogni-
tion of emotional feelings. A claim for affect in performance needs to outline 
how it is known, otherwise affect remains a generalization that carries the 
implicit associations of a powerful force that is unintentionally created and 
absorbed. An explanation of energies and activity can suffice for a general 
description of how affect happens but responses to a specific performance also 
involve personal perspectives that can lead to resistance.
This consideration of ‘live’ and ‘presence’ reveals some of the ways in which 
a type of depersonalized experience becomes perceptible to audiences – 
although not easily explicable. These qualities suggest that affect can be rec-
ognized along with emotional feeling in relation to intensity. Performance 
points to oscillating connections between general and specific forms of affect, 
mood, emotional feeling and the emotions.
Formless affect and aesthetic form
The robot in Uncanny Valley said to the live audience, ‘you have more free-
dom than I do’. They were free to move around and implicitly to change 
in self determined ways, whereas his form was fixed and controlled. Yet 
the robot also suggested affect freed from biological form. Massumi outlines 
how affect can be considered ‘unformed’ and ‘unstructured’ in that it seeks 
to escape containment (2002: 260, note 3). The conception of affect as being 
outside forms and categories suggests a formless condition. Affect’s capacity 
in performance suggests an energetic quality that surrounds expressive forms. 
The designation of political impact is philosophically intriguing because it 
implies that affect can be unstructured and still be collectively apprehended 
(Massumi 2010). Erin Manning describes collective experience emerging out 
of Gilbert Simondon’s ideas of freeing the human from a bodily form and 
Deleuze’s idea of energetic instability unfolding so that ‘[t]he body in-forms 
as it multiplies into phases of becoming’ (2010: 118). Affect occurs at the 
nexus of what is being formed.
Affect that is unrestricted would seem to dissipate a quality of intensity, and 
the Uncanny Valley robot also said, ‘I’m behaving like you so you can recognize 
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me’. In performance, form focuses spectator attention even though responses 
will, to some extent, be contingent on pre-existing patterns. Moreover, while 
affect is theorized as formless, it is being used to consider viewer responses 
in art and to cinema and also to music and web-based interaction (Grossberg 
2010). The reception of performance in theatre, television and cinema becomes 
affectively immersive when a spectator loses awareness of the immediate sur-
roundings; temporal spatial artistic forms absorb the attention.
The idea of formlessness creates challenges for performance and its inten-
tional effects. The proposition that affect met resistance as it circulated across 
and through aesthetic forms that also invited emotional feeling became evi-
dent in the viewing of Uncanny Valley and Licking Dogs. A fleeting sensation 
of affect can be distinguished from other feelings elicited by bodies and non-
human objects, and because emotionally felt responses to theatrical perfor-
mance arise more intermittently, and last longer, expanding or contracting 
through relational engagement. Live performance offers an immediate expe-
rience within a durational framework that can be evaluated for the ways in 
which affect intersects with emotional forms.
The absence of a human performer in Uncanny Valley facilitates the recogni-
tion of affect and its intensity. While narrative and biography offer a shareable 
description, it is more difficult to specify energetic aspects of the aesthetic expe-
rience even as the uncanny robot form coincided with a politic about human 
obsolescence. Theatrical performance offers an affective realm that rests on 
top of – or nested within – a larger affective world. Likewise, personal feeling 
can be located within a depersonalized effect. While the Deleuzian-influenced 
theory of affect offers important possibilities for the analysis of aspects of per-
formance, it need not overshadow ideas of live, presence and emotional feeling. 
The rethinking of live performance reception with affect theory in the twenty- 
first century can enhance existing theoretical perspectives.
Affect theory allows for an impersonal energetic field that intersects with, 
or resists material forms. But analysis of affect in performance needs to offer 
more than energetic presumption. Perspectives on affect often assume that 
there is a capacity for affect, but as the subsequent chapters reveal about ideas 
of emotions and emotional feelings and mood, these have distinctive forms 
within theatrical performance, which deliberately challenge as well as con-
firm human experience and its political significance.
Unformed affect seems immeasurable. But the consideration of affect in 
this chapter acknowledges a general energetic effect that circulates within 
a depersonalizing dimension surrounding personal forms. Bodily sensation 
becomes recognizable in performance in relation to aesthetic forms and their 
movement and also through resistance to them. Theatrical performance 
invites recognition of intangible qualities within processes that also convey 
social and political implications. It does more than mimic a lived world as it 
probes the connection between sharable and subjective experience and links 
abstract general concepts to specific material practice. Performance harnesses 
affect insofar as it connects with expressive artistic and emotional forms.
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